Simondon and Big Data by Mills, Simon
Simondon and Big Data 
Simon Mills – De Montfort University 
SMills@dmu.ac.uk 
This article explores some limitations of the claims made for Big Data, particularly in the work of Alex 
Pentland, as providing a universal method for understanding and managing the social. It does so by analysing 
Pentland’s social physics in the light of the work of Gilbert Simondon. It argues that Pentland’s social theory is 
essentially cybernetic and thus open to Simondon’s criticisms of this schema of understanding. Additionally, it 
questions the way social physics leads to the development of hypertelic social structures; its lack of ability for 
theorizing invention, teleology and open systems; and queries the social ontology it has developed. Simondon's 
reformed notion of information, situated as it is, between determinism and indeterminism, may not disagree 
with Pentland’s claim that “we're going to reinvent what it means to have a human society,” but understands the 
nature of this claim in a radically different way. Where Pentland’s work points towards yet another phase of the 
control revolution, this article asserts that it misses the more important question of how it theorizes indeter-
minacy and omits consideration of the transindividual as a mode of the social. 
“The rise of the Information Society itself, more than even the parallel development of formal information 
theory, has exposed the centrality of information processing, communication, and control to all aspects of 
human society and social behaviour. It is to these fundamental informational concepts, I believe, that we 
social scientists may hope to reduce our proliferating but still largely unsystematic knowledge of social 
structure and process” (Beniger, 1986, p. 436). With this conclusion to his extensive historical analysis of 
the development of the role of information for social control, James Beniger reaffirms the importance for 
sociology of a broadly cybernetic understanding of society. Although he questions first-order cybernetics 
focus on control behaviour rather than programming  it is clear that, in his view, the three Cs of cybernet1 -
ics (command, control, and communication) offer the most promising approach for understanding social 
complexity. We are currently witnessing the furtherance of that project with the recent development of 
Big Data.  
In this article we will explore some of the limitations for the sociological claims made for Big Data 
through the lens of the work of the philosopher, Gilbert Simondon. By doing so we also hope to demon-
strate the ongoing relevance of Simondon’s work. In particular we will focus on Alex Pentland’s work on 
social physics (2014), which is the most fully developed theory for the application of Big Data to 
understanding the social produced to date. Another aim is to situate Big Data, and in particular social 
physics, within the genealogy of cybernetics. One of the striking achievements of Simondon’s work is that 
he questioned the main tenets of cybernetics, prior to it attaining widespread application, whilst also 
developing upon the work of cybernetics himself. 
At the outset, it is necessary to be clear regarding what some of the claims being made for Big Data are 
in relation to the domain of the social. According to Kitchin (2013), what is new regarding Big Data is 
not just the massive volume of data available but also the near real-time speed of its collection and distri-
bution (velocity) from a wide number of sources (variety). This being due to the widespread usage of 
networked digital devices. The overall aim being to collect and analyse an exhaustive amount of data regar-
ding the targeted population. 
Although initial claims for Big Data’s ability for modelling and prediction were made in relation to 
business, marketing, science and economics, increasingly it is being touted as offering solutions in other 
areas such as healthcare, transport, housing, and more generally as offering a broad sociological method. 
 Whereas control is defined as “purposive influence toward a predetermined goal”, Beniger (1986, pp. 39-40) calls the setting of 1
the goal to be achieved programming.
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Such ambition is also closely related to the development of phenomenon such as the Internet of Things, 
Web Squared and persuasive technology.  2
Many of the applications to which Big Data has been applied involve relatively closed systems where 
data is collected to investigate particular problems. For example, it is used for systems controlling traffic 
flow, where real-time data is algorithmically analysed relative to models in order to steer them towards a 
pre-programmed state.  
A significant issue with this approach is gaining an understanding of the causal operation of the sys-
tems involved. As is well documented the use of quantitative data, due to the problem of induction, leads 
to the ability to derive correlations but not necessarily the presence of causality. One notorious claim made 
for Big Data by Chris Anderson (2008, no page) is that it dissolves this problem through the sheer scale of 
quantitative analysis: 
This is a world where massive amounts of data and applied mathematics replace every other tool that 
might be brought to bear. Out with every theory of human behaviour, from linguistics to sociology. 
Forget taxonomy, ontology and psychology ... We can throw the numbers into the biggest computing 
clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms find patterns where science cannot. 
The strong claim for Big Data, then, is that our understanding of systems of all kind will emerge from 
working on data itself and messy theoretical struggles regarding interpretation will be dispensed with. 
Kitchin (2013, p. 130) sees this as a re-emergence of empiricism in which the model is to “collect first and 
ask questions later” (Croll as quoted in Kitchin 2013). 
Although there is good reason to be optimistic about some of the claims made for the use of Big Data 
for regulating relatively closed and limited systems or networks (e.g. the electricity grid, traffic control, 
shopping behaviours), should we approach the more ambitious claims made for it to regulate society as a 
whole with some caution? For example, how seriously should we take Alex Pentland, a leading proponent 
for Big Data, when he states: 
Adam Smith and Karl Marx were wrong, or at least had only half the answers. Why? Because they 
talked about markets and classes, but those are aggregates. They're averages ... This is the first time in 
human history that we have the ability to see enough about ourselves that we can hope to actually 
build social systems that work qualitatively better than the systems we've always had. That’s a remark-
able change. It’s like the phase transition that happened when writing was developed or when 
education became ubiquitous, or perhaps when people began being tied together via the Internet 
(Pentland 2012). 
It is clear from this statement that Pentland’s aim is to undermine traditional theories of social abstrac-
tion and develop his own operationalized abstraction with a wholly quantitative and empiricist basis 
whose scientific credentials are underscored by the name “social physics”. However, as well as dismissing 
theories based on class Pentland is clear that social physics is not just going to be a reductionist theory, 
such as found in some recent economic theories regarding individuals as rational actors whose collective 
actions lead to an emergent equilibrium. Pentland (2014, p. 4) maintains the existence of “social effects” 
and claims that these are constituted, in a manner reminiscent of the account given in cybernetics, 
through the flow of information and ideas: 
Social physics is a quantitative social science that describes reliable, mathematical connections between 
information and idea flow on the one hand and people’s behaviour on the other. Social physics helps 
us understand how ideas flow from person to person through the mechanism of social learning and 
 The Internet of Things and Web Squared point to the increasingly widespread and automated ways in which data is collected, 2
distributed and analysed in real time. Persuasive technology describes the way that such data can be utilized to attempt to manage 
user behaviour.
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how this flow of ideas ends up shaping the norms, productivity and creative output of our companies, 
cities and societies.  
Social physics thus differs from the economic rational actor approach which views individuals as rationally 
determining their goals and actions because it demonstrates “that both peoples desires and their decisions 
about how to act are often dominated by social network effects” (Pentland, 2014, p. 59). As such it shifts 
the focus away from individuals as drivers of action onto the flows of information and ideas which indi-
viduals inhabit: “ideas flow is the real story of community and culture. The rest is just surface appearance 
and illusion” (Pentland, 2014, p. 44).  
Pentland’s (2014, p. 20) definition of an idea is “a strategy for instrumental behaviour” and 
information is “an observation that can be incorporated into an idea”. As such, although Pentland allows 
for individual goals and motives these are subsumed into the overall flow of ideas throughout social 
networks. 
The promise of social physics is to map the patterns created by these flows of information and ideas in 
order to understand social behaviour at a more fine-grained level of micropatterns, “because they don't 
just average out to the classical way of understanding society” (Pentland, 2014, p. 10). Pentland further 
maintains that traditional quantitative and qualitative sociological methods collect insufficient amounts of 
data to come close to being able to develop predictive models of future behaviour.  
This is where Big Data comes to the fore. It is the ability to use contemporary digital technology to 
collect, store and analyse vast amounts of “digital bread crumbs” which enables social physics to accurately 
map social networks and see how “ideas turn into behaviour and action”. 
But of course, the overriding goal of such an enterprise is not just to map the operation of the social 
but, in the tradition of socio-cybernetics as developed by Wiener and Beer, to develop strategies for its 
command and control. As such Pentland’s (2014, p. 171) text is littered with claims for the positive 
potential of “reality mining” such as when discussing applying social physics to cities; “we want to engi-
neer the environment to enhance both exploration and engagement”; or that social networks “can provide 
more effective incentives to promote the development and enforcement of useful social norms. We need to 
begin applying these lessons to reinvent our current economic, government, and work systems” (Pentland, 
2014, p. 208).  
As far as Pentland (2014, p. 180) is concerned the main issue preventing this project from fulfilling its 
utopian potential is that of privacy, or to use terms which rather give away the implicit liberal politics 
underpinning his work, to “define ownership rights” so that we “recognize personal data as a valuable asset 
of the individual that is given to companies and government in return for services”. 
In what follows I want to think about the sociological claims made for Big Data via the work of Gilbert 
Simondon. It is my contention that social physics emerged from a cybernetic world picture updated to 
reflect contemporary technological developments. As such, Simondon’s work is particularly relevant due to 
its unique position in combining aspects of cybernetics with the tradition of French epistemology as well 
as developing an original perspective on both technology and the nature of the social. The claims made for 
Big Data and for social physics traverse these same domains and as such a dialogue between them seems 
appropriate. 
Open systems and hypertelia 
An initial observation, from a Simondonian perspective, is that in the claims made for Big Data, especially 
in relation to social physics, little has been mentioned regarding the extent of the openness of the systems 
under discussion. Pentland (2012; 2014, p. 203) is optimistic for the potential of Big Data for maintain-
ing concretized techno-social mechanisms whose stability he claims can be improved through designing in 
“social efficiency, operational efficiency, and resilience”:  
That’s the promise of Big Data, to really understand the systems that make our technological society. 
As you begin to understand them, then you can build systems that are better. The promise is for finan-
cial systems that don't melt down, governments that don't get mired in inaction, health systems that 
actually work, and so on, and so forth. 
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One danger of such a proposition is that it aims towards the development of hypertelic social structures. 
To understand the implication of this we need to briefly describe the central role that individuation plays 
in Simondon’s ontology for understanding a broad range of phenomena and for avoiding a substantialist 
metaphysic. Simondon expends much effort critiquing metaphysical theories which assume a priori the 
existence of fully-constituted individuals. His ontology is concerned rather with the ontogenetic opera-
tions by which individuals come to be structured and continue to individuate. 
Generally speaking, for Simondon the development and continuing individuation of a system occurs 
due to the retention of a double relationship to both an associated milieu and to what he calls the pre-
individual . One of the places where Simondon most clearly explains his notion of individuation is in 3
relation to technical individuals: 
Such individualization is possible because of the recurrence of causality in the environment which the 
technical being creates around itself, an environment which it influences and by which it is influenced. 
This environment, which is at the same time natural and technical, can be called the associated milieu. 
By means of this the technical being is conditioned in its operation. This is no fabricated milieu, or at 
least it is not wholly fabricated; it is a definite system of natural elements surrounding the technical 
object. The associated milieu is the mediator of the relationship between manufactured technical 
elements and natural elements within which the technical being functions (Simondon, 1980, p. 60). 
From this we can ascertain that the individualization of a technical individual as a coherent system means 
that its own operation partially determines the necessary conditions for its continuing operation; that a 
satisfactory environment for the technical object is created by some transformation of a part of the natural 
world; and that technical individuals operate with a level of indeterminacy which enables them to indi-
viduate further in relation to changes in the external environment. 
In addition to the stipulation of an associated milieu it is also worthwhile mentioning the difference of 
the abstract technical object from that of the concrete. The development of a technical object occurs via a 
process of increasing concretization: 
The essence of the concretization of a technical object is the organizing of functional sub-systems into 
the total functioning ... Each structure fulfills a number of functions; but in the abstract technical 
object each structure fulfills only one essential and positive function that is integrated into the 
functioning of the whole, whereas in the concrete technical object all functions fulfilled by a particular 
structure are positive, essential, and integrated into the functioning whole (Simondon, 1980, p. 31). 
The difference is that a technical object which contains abstract structures necessary to its operation is 
comprised of a number of systems which are operationally independent from one another and which each 
perform only a single function. As such their operation often conflicts, as they aren't operationally inte-
grated. The process of concretization has occurred when the requirement for such abstract structures is 
overcome by a solution that utilizes a single structure, which operates with a coherent level of pluri-
functionality. 
An example Simondon gives is that of a water-cooled combustion engine which consists of two abstract 
systems (the engine and the water cooling system) the concretized solution to which is the use of gills on 
the piston cylinder which solves the problem of cooling through air flow whilst also functioning as part of 
the structural support for the cylinder. An object is described as hypertelic when it is so closed as to be 
abstracted from both its genesis and any possibility of further functional development. A hypertelic tool 
signifies the completion of a lineage, to which no more development can be made. 
 The pre-individual is a foundational concept in Simondon’s ontology, in the sense that it supplies his ontogenetic ontology with 3
a non-substantial primary reality. As such the pre-individual is the “first phase of being” that also has the capacity to fall out of 
phase with itself. Thus the pre-individual does not name a primary substance but the fundamental condition of being as 
metastable. Simondon’s (2005, p. 327) main sources of inspiration for the pre-individual comes from thermodynamic notion of 
metastability which describes a state rich in potentials and that is neither wholly stable nor unstable but can “produce a sudden 
alteration leading to a new equally metastable structure”. 
62 • Platform: Journal of Media and Communication 
Volume 6 (2015): 59-72.
Although the description used so far has been specific to the individuation of technical individuals this 
general schema is also applied by Simondon to a broad range of phenomena at different scales. For 
example, in The Limits of Human Progress (2010, p. 230), Simondon describes human cultural progress 
(‘the entire system of activity and existence constituted by what man produces and what man is’) using the 
same terms as those used to describe technical development, that is as the progressive operation of 
concretizing relations between differing domains (e.g. language, ethics, religion, technology) in order to 
resolve disparities. Progress in any domain requires that it isn't saturated (hypertelic) but retains a degree 
of resonance, both internally and with other domains, to enable further development. Such development 
is also described as occurring via phase shifts involving the division of domains and the transformation of 
their relations. 
However, we should be careful in too swiftly transposing the account of the mode of individuation of 
technical objects onto that of other domains, such as that of vital and psychic individuals. Although there 
are many similarities with how the individuation of these are understood there are also significant differ-
ences which ensure that, for example, the individuation of a vital individual can never be reduced to that 
of a technical individual. The individuation of technical objects occurs in discrete leaps whereas vital indi-
viduation is continuous. These differences are far too complex to give an account of here where all that’s 
required is an understanding of the general axiomatic at work in Simondon’s ontology. 
Simondon’s account of the individuation of psychic individuals also shares some of these common 
aspects such as the importance of the subject’s relation to its milieu and the overcoming of problems. 
However an additional aspect of this account involves the role of meaning. To help clarify this Simondon 
(1989, p. 126) brings into play the difference between signals and signification. Individuation involves the 
overcoming of problematic disparities through a process of resolution, the result of which is the 
appearance of an individual (individualization), or “a new systematic” by which signification also appears. 
Signification here is the concurrent development of meaning or sense which accompanies the resolving 
individuation of a new systematic. In contrast signals are representative and can be understood as being 
like the messages passed between individualized individuals in traditional Information Theory. Signif-
ication however marks the actual spatio-temporal accomplishment of an individual’s individuation in 
relation to both its environment and within itself. 
There may appear a superficial similarity between Simondon’s use of signal and signification with 
Pentland’s use of information and ideas here. However, where Pentland’s understanding of the social 
focuses just on the flow of ideas and information Simondon highlights the central role of individuation, of 
both the psychic individual and the collective, associated with signification. In this way Simondon resists 
the hypertelia to which Pentland’s account is susceptible. 
The questions need to be asked, if we are to interrogate the sociological claims made for Big Data from 
a Simondonian perspective, to what extent do these claims rely on an assumption of social systems as 
being abstract enough that their continued operation can be maintained in a controlled state of 
equilibrium via data analysis or conversely, and perhaps more troubling, to what extent does such 
proposed management of the social require that it becomes hypertelic? 
 Pentland’s social physics doesn't entirely fail to respond to these questions but its responses are limited. 
The vast majority of the systems discussed in his book concern what can be considered as examples of syst-
ems understood in a relatively abstract sense such as financial investing, health monitoring, marketing and 
improving the productivity of a company. Although we know that the complexity of the social means that 
all these examples, as well as many others, are interconnected to some extent, Pentland needs to under-
stand them as relatively closed. He is therefore more akin in his thinking to the theorizing of autopoieses 
such as that of Maturana, Varela and Luhmann.  4
 As such social physics' main concern is with the self-maintenance of systems, or their untroubled 
operation in relations of structural coupling. In itself this is an understandable enterprise when involving 
the protection and improvement of public utility systems. However, is the possibility of expanding such a 
 Making such a comparison is problematic given the theoretical differences of these thinkers. However, Pentland’s social physics 4
shares aspects of autopoiesis with its assumed operational closure of systems such that they operate only utilizing that which they 
produce.
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vision to the much larger and more complex situation of society as a whole really feasible? Such a goal 
points to the necessity of the becoming hypertelic of the social; that is programming its set purpose to that 
of homeostatic regulation. Such a vision would encourage dispensing with the political in favour of the 
technocratic. 
This is where the other relationship that the individual holds, its relation to the pre-individual, 
becomes significant. In simple terms, this can be understood as how the system is related to its openness 
with what it is not. In respect of the technical object Simondon writes: 
[T]he existence of the technical object is sustained by a double relationship – a relationship with its 
geographic environment on the one hand, and with its technical environment on the other. The 
technical object stands at the point where two environments come together, and it ought to be inte-
grated into both these environments at the same time. Still, these two environments are two worlds 
that do not belong to the same system and are not necessarily completely compatible with each other 
(Simondon, 1980, p. 54). 
Without this secondary relationship any system is incomplete and in danger of becoming hypertelic – that 
is focused on a single unwavering purpose. The problem with the use of Big Data to control any system is 
that it faces the problem of integration with a broader and oft changing environment, which is a likely 
source of indeterminism. This is, of course, usually the role of politics, a subject which receives scant 
attention in Pentland’s (2014, p. 203) book, tending as he does to take it as self evident that the core 
social aim is that of technocratic efficiency and resilience in an environment which provides “for indiv-
iduals to make correct decisions and develop useful behavioural norms”. 
It also begs the question of what is the purpose of society as a whole, if it is to be subject to such con-
trol? This is Beniger’s problem of programming previously mentioned, which has its roots in the cybernetic 
concern with finality. This question is elided by Pentland and, just as importantly from a Simondonian 
perspective, so is the role of invention. 
Invention and information 
What is at stake with claims being made for social physics’ ability to maintain the social in equilibrium via 
control, or its ability to predict future states of the social system in order to enable it to adapt, is the role 
of invention. One claim is that through the implementation of social physics we will “begin to explain 
many things – crashes, revolutions, bubbles – that previously appeared to be random “acts of God’” (Pent-
land 2014, p. 9). From these explanations arise the potential to adapt behaviour, for as Pentland (2014, p. 
106) aphoristically contends, “What isn't measured cannot be managed”. 
It is precisely the removal of indeterminism and novelty from the domain of the social that is being 
proposed. That Pentland (2014, p. 16) states that “social physics is inherently probabilistic” in its meas-
urement of information flow belies its affinity to cybernetics and the probabilistic notion of information 
as the mathematical measure of the uncertainty surrounding the communication of a message between 
two entities.  
For Simondon, however, the cybernetic notion of information as something measurable should not be 
understood as describing a fundamental reality. Simondon describes the cybernetic account of 
information as “secondary information” indicating that it is founded on a more primary kind of 
information. For Simondon, this secondary information is too hylemorphic and atomistic in nature, given 
that it focuses only on already individuated individuals between which signals are sent and received. Such 
an understanding enables a probabilistic account of systems that are able to adapt to environmental 
changes within narrow parameters, but Simondon’s conception of being is one in which the role of 
invention is central and which exposes the weakness of information so described. 
In part, Simondon’s project is a reformulation of cybernetics, which has at its heart a reworking of the 
notion of information that acknowledges novelty. As noted above, in reference to the importance of the 
notion of the pre-individual, Simondon’s ontology is founded on thermodynamics. A key concept 
Simondon borrows from this science, which helps him place invention at the core of his ontology, is that 
of the phase-transition. A phase transition occurs when a system shifts from one relatively stable state of 
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equilibrium to another, such as when water turns to ice or when a liquid is heated in such a way as to 
produce convection rolls. These transitions occur when certain systemic thresholds are crossed which leave 
the system in a metastable or critical state. In fact Simondon’s (1964, p. 130) notion of (primary) 
information is based on a first-order phase transition that he describes as “the arrival of a singularity 
establishing a communication between levels of reality”.  
The difference between levels of reality that come into tension with one another is described as a disp-
arity forming a problem for being which needs resolution to a higher level. It is the arrival of a singularity 
that causes a resolving structuration to occur around it through the invention of a new spatio-temporal 
reality. Information is not then something measurable but refers to the process of in-formation of one 
level into another thus resolving a disparity. It is this structuring process that Simondon calls transduction. 
This is not to say that embracing a Simondonian prioritization of primary information entails ruling 
out the possibility of more highly determined mechanisms or the mathematical interpretation of some 
systems. However, what we find is that there are a broad range of systems with varying levels of determ-
ination and that indeterminacy does not have to be located at the level of the already individuated 
information-as-message but can be found at a more fundamental ontological level. What Simondon’s 
levels based ontology enables, beyond the probabilistic ontology of cybernetic information, is an account 
that includes strong emergence and not just adaptation. Such a distinction is consistent with the 
difference between weak and strong emergence.  
Weak emergence describes when a phenomenon emerges from a lower level in an unexpected and surp-
rising manner. It is also called epistemic emergence as the impossibility of predicting it is due to a 
limitation of knowledge of the lower levels from which emergence occurs. Essentially, with weak emer-
gence the claim is that we could predict emergent phenomena if we only had more data regarding the 
situation in the first place. This is basically the claim of Big Data, that by gathering more data about any 
system we can predict how it might adapt. 
Strong emergence describes events that aren't merely epistemologically unpredictable but are instances 
of the production of ontologically novel phenomenon that are “not deducible even in principle from truths 
of lower level domain” (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, p. 92). The claim here is that it is not possible to 
predict some phenomenon however much data you have. 
These two types of emergence differ in their understanding of the role of the environment. The adap-
tionist theory tends to understand systems being able to adapt to environmental changes by inhabiting 
already virtually present pre-adaptations, rather than the stronger thesis that the environment is causally 
implicated in an operation of radical creation, that is to say, the invention of something completely novel. 
As we have seen an individual maintains a double relationship with both an associated milieu and to 
the pre-individual and attempts to integrate both of these in an inventive and resolving act. The implica-
tion here is that the individual doesn’t always adapt to environmental changes but that sometimes such 
openness requires a leap of invention. 
At this point it is useful to remind ourselves that social physics is not the first attempt to utilize quanti-
tative data to model and regulate the social. For example, Stafford Beer’s theory of the Viable Systems 
Model (VSM), which he developed from 1972 onwards, was an attempt to develop operational real-time 
models of various social systems based on quantitative data flows, whose aim was to enable such systems 
to survive “in an environment that was not just fluctuating but also changing” (Pickering, 2010, p. 244). 
As such, and although he never mentions it, Pentland’s project is resolutely in the tradition of cybernetics. 
Pentland’s project echoes that of Beer in that he begins by conceiving such modelling to help structure 
and maintain relatively small systems such as factories and firms but goes on to extrapolate from this the 
possibility of similarly running whole societies. The pinnacle of this, for Beer, was the Cybersyn project he 
helped organize in Allende’s Chile but which was brought to a premature close by political events in that 
country. 
The VSM is relevant when considering social physics because one of its explicit aims was to enable a 
social system to survive and adapt in a world of constant change and becoming. It did this through the 
implementation of a “performative epistemology” (Pickering, 2010, p. 251) that was troubled by the 
problems of which information flows were relevant and how were they related? So described, Beer was 
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confronting, as many of the second-order cyberneticists did, the problem of weak emergence in that it 
wasn't always clear which data to collect and how to interpret them. As Pickering describes it: 
What might adaptation of these models in practice mean? I just described adaptation in the VSM as 
open ended, but Beer imagined and was prepared to implement something less than this in his 
models. He understood them as sets of mathematical equations linking long lists of variables such as 
demand, revenue, technological and economic change, dividends, share prices, and the money market. 
And the basic form of these sets of equations was not, in itself, revisable, at least as part of Beer’s 
description of the regular functioning of a viable system. What could be revised in practice were the 
parameters figuring in these equations which specified the intensity of the couplings between variables. 
Beer’s models were thus adaptive, but only to a degree, within a fixed overall form (Pickering, 2010, p. 
252). 
What is interesting here is that not only did Beer struggle to deal with the problem of weak epistemic 
emergence but that, even though he had an awareness of it, he could not even confront the thornier issue 
of the environments radical role in invention, which Simondon describes with his ontogenetic notion of 
information.  
The best Beer could achieve was to model the social on an understanding of organisms as adaptive to 
their environment and not as inherently inventive in their individuation. Pentland’s social physics seems 
oblivious to these previous discussions. For him, they appear blithely resolved through sheer mass of data, 
much as Anderson claims.  
So, as well as invention being a seemingly insuperable problem for social physics, Beer’s experience 
with his VSM also makes clear that epistemological issues such as with selection bias and conceiving of 
ways that data should be interpreted and which data should be collected and related have yet to be ackno-
wledged. It remains unclear how having bigger data sets makes these problems disappear. 
The analogy which Beer makes of social systems with organisms is typical of a long-running fascination 
cybernetics had with reducing all phenomena to mere informational flows and thereby erasing ontological 
difference in order to contrast forms of behaviour. Although Pentland certainly doesn’t think of society in 
terms of an organism it is worth asking what analogy might be in play in social physics. 
The role of analogy in social physics 
The role of analogy is crucial for cybernetics. From the outset cyberneticists such as Wiener and Ashby 
drew analogies between systems which enacted the same kind of purposive behaviour but were materially 
distinct; such as between games and the economy, cellular automata and living organisms, and brains and 
computers. For example, in their seminal paper, “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology”, Rosenblueth, Wiener 
and Bigelow drew an analogy between a human patient with a damaged cerebellum who is unable to 
drink a glass of water and the operation of a machine with an “inadequately damped’ feedback mecha-
nism”  
From such behavioural analogies it was a short distance to claiming an isomorphism between organ-
isms and machines and hence the ongoing fascination with studying machine behaviour. It is unnecessary 
here to explore examples but just state that first-order cybernetics was interested in drawing analogies 
based on the exhibition of forms of behaviour and similarity regarding regulation towards a purpose. 
As already discussed, Simondon was critical of the cybernetic formulation of information which he saw 
as both hylemorphic and atomistic. Another issue he had with cybernetics was its use of analogy. In a key 
passage of his thesis called allagmatics Simondon makes an important distinction between two types of 
analogy: 
[A]nalogical thought is that which observes identities of relations, not relations of identity but it must 
clarify that these identities of relation are the identities of operative relations, not the identities of 
structural relationships. By itself it discovers the opposition between resemblance and analogy: 
resemblance is given from structural relationships. Pseudoscientific thought makes substantial use of 
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resemblance, sometimes even the resemblance of vocabulary, but it does not make use of analogy. 
(Simondon, 2005, p. 563). 
For Simondon (2005, p. 564) an analogy is only valid “if it covers a world where beings are defined by 
their operations and not by their structures”. An analogy based on structures does not in fact constitute an 
analogy for Simondon but merely a resemblance because it “cannot reach the whole reality of being”. 
Simondon’s theory of knowledge is thus premised on his ontological account of the operation of being. 
This isn't to say that Simondon dismissed such resemblance as being of no use, rather one had to be 
careful of overstepping the limitations of its suitability. For Simondon the cybernetic schema of under-
standing the world is one amongst a set of other schemas (e.g. Hylemorphism, Cartesianism) which has 
been developed by analogy from the operation of different technologies: 
In this sense, technology manifests in successive waves a power of analogical interpretation that is sui 
generis ... None of the schemas exhausts a domain, but each of them accounts for a certain number of 
effects in each domain, and allows for the passage of one domain to another (Simondon, 2005, p. 18). 
However, the attempt to universally apply such schemas is problematic as it misses the ontological reality 
of operation and reifies understanding in poor analogies across distinct domains. Additionally, Simondon 
(2001, p. 175) also warns of the reductive, fragmentary and inductive nature of these schemas which by 
extrapolating from the particular to the universal fail to “account for the existence of the totality, taken as 
a unity, but does account for the point by point and instant by instant functioning of that totality”. As 
such the universal application of such schemas runs the risk of a hypertelia in thought. 
Simondon’s theory of schemas resonates with some work in French Epistemology, such as Bachelard’s 
notion of epistemic breaks and Canguilhem’s historical understanding of the development of knowledge. 
His contribution is that he ontologizes this process, something which becomes clearer in his work on the 
image-cycle in Imagination et invention. 
In what way does this relate to social physics and big data? We can acknowledge that Pentland’s theor-
izing of social physics is actually very close to cybernetics' with its focus on behaviour. Thus, in a 
description that resonates with the cybernetic focus on behaviour and purpose, Pentland describes the 
power of social physics as coming from: 
...the fact that almost all our day-today actions are habitual, based mostly on what we have learned 
from observing the behaviour of others. Because most of our actions are habitual and based on phys-
ical, observable experiences, i.e., stories heard, actions seen, etc., they can be described as repeated 
patterns. This means that we can observe humans in just the same way we observe apes or bees and 
derive rules of behaviour, reaction and learning (Pentland, 2014, p. 190). 
As described earlier, for social physics, the ultimate reality behind behaviour is the flow of information 
and ideas, which Pentland (2014, p. 20) describes rather tautologically as: “The propagation of behaviours 
and beliefs through a social network by means of social learning and social pressure. Idea flow takes into 
account the social network structure, the strength of the social influences between each pair of people, as 
well as the individual susceptibility to new ideas”. 
So, with Pentland’s use of Big Data are we also witnessing the implementation of a reductive technical 
schema that “tends towards a phenomenology of regimes of activity, without an ontological presupposi-
tion that is relative to the nature of that which enters into activity”? 
It seems apparent from the above that Pentland’s schema for understanding the social is little more 
than a limited ontological schema developed from abstracting the flow of information through technical 
social networks. Thus it comes as no surprise that Pentland’s idea of an improved social system “might 
look a lot like Wikipedia but founded on overlapping clusters of buddies who have face-to-face relation-
ships” (Pentland, 2014, p. 209). 
As such social physics can be understood as implementing an analogical technical schema that should 
be treated with as much care as the others discussed above (including cybernetics to which it is similar) in 
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regard to the validity of the analogies made from them. That is not to say that what social physics tells us 
isn't useful in any way, rather that the limitations of its ontology must be acknowledged. As we have 
already shown, Beer was already aware of such limitations whereas Pentland fails to acknowledge them. In 
the next sections we will consider how Simondons reformed cybernetic ontology addresses the social and 
the question of finality. 
The transindividual 
It should now be apparent that Simondon’s ontology is concerned with individuation and not mere adap-
tation or homeostasis. That is to say that in his descriptions of the ontogenesis of the various regimes 
which constitute nature (physical, vital, psycho-social) he is not seeking a description in which change 
occurs just through the actualization of adjacent potentialities, as an adaptive response to environmental 
change. What fascinates Simondon is what makes possible the emergence of novelty. 
As already discussed the collection of ever more amounts of data does not necessitate a more developed 
understanding of the processes involved in social change. If anything, what Pentland’s project aims at is 
the becoming hypertelic of the social. 
We claim, in accordance with Simondon, that what the theoreticians of Big Data are missing is a 
philosophy of nature that undermines substantialism. Simondon’s theory of individuation, grounded on 
energetic metastability holds as fundamental the ability of being (social or otherwise) to fall out of phase 
with itself, and to be restructured, as in a secondary phase shift, by a germ of information. 
Applying his theory of individuation to the regime of the psycho-social Simondon develops one of his 
most striking theories, that of the transindividual. Simondon makes a distinction between two modes in 
which psychic individuals are related: the inter-individual and the transindividual. The inter-individual 
relation is that which most closely resembles the social abstraction found in Pentland. In this mode the 
relations between individuals are normative in that they relate to one another in accordance with the repr-
esentations they have of one another as fully constituted individuals. Such a relation is functional and 
brings to mind the relation of fully formed entities passing and interpreting messages in conventional 
information theory. 
This resembles Pentland’s (2014, p. 21) theorizing of society as “mostly made up of networks of 
exchanges between individuals”. Such a mode has two problems for Simondon. First, that from the 
perspective of the psychic individual this relation is unable to help resolve the problem of anxiety it feels 
in response to that which it is not. This is what Simondon (1989, p. 191) calls the problem of embodied 
immanence which cannot be resolved by the inter-individual relation as this is a relation that merely “goes 
from one individual to another” but “it does not penetrate individuals”. 
Second, the inter-individual relation fails to offer a means for true social invention. For this to be pos-
sible individuals need to form a system with one another which brings them into a state of resonance by 
which fresh structuration can emerge. For Simondon, the psychic and social are two poles of (and perspec-
tives on) a single relation (the social relation) and the solution to both the problems mentioned above 
comes about through a transformation of the mode of this relation from the inter-individual to the 
transindividual: 
transindividual action is what makes individuals exist together as the elements of a system including 
potentials and metastability, anticipation and tension, then the discovery of a structure and a func-
tional organization that integrates and resolves this problematic of embodied immanence (Simondon, 
1989, p. 191). 
Just as we witnessed with the individuation of the individual, the individuation of the transindividual 
also requires the attainment of signification. In the case of the transindividual the signification of the indi-
vidual and the collective together create a problematic whose resolution is the structuring of the collective. 
The transindividual mode thus solves both the problem of embodied immanence (through the individual 
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being able to extend itself as part of a group) and that of change in a truly psycho-social gesture where 
individuals come into resonance with one another and form a metastable system.  5
What enables the emergence of the transindividual is not just the flow of ideas between individuals (a 
la Pentland) but the individuation of the collective through the use of pre-individual potentiality, which 
individuals carry with them, as well as signification. As such the transindividual denotes a physical indi-
viduation, commensurate with energetics, like any other.  
What is being specified by the pre-individual for the level of the collective? To be clear what Simondon 
is proposing in this context, far exceeds just the passage of ideas in a network, although would include it. 
The answer cannot be too specific, but as we saw in the description of technical individuation the resou-
rces for individuation are found both in relation to an associated milieu and the environment. What 
Simondon is suggesting is that the source of potentiality for psycho-social individuation cannot be 
bounded due to its radical environmental openness. 
As such the transindividual also builds on those funds of potentiality from that which is already 
individuated. For example, the sharing of common beliefs can enable a transindividual relation between 
members of a group, but the fund of potential resources is far broader and would include the whole 
gradation of psychic activity from sensation and affect to the social structuring of emotion and ideation. 
Beyond these Simondon also develops a unique theory of the imagination in which images and artefacts 
(what he calls image-objects) can play a role in structuring the social. It is worth quoting at length an 
interesting passage from Imagination et invention where he discusses the role of images in this respect: 
In effect, the image, as intermediate reality between the concrete and abstract, between self and world, 
is not only mental: it materializes, becomes institution, product, wealth, and is diffused as much 
through commercial networks as through the “mass media” disseminating information. Its 
intermediate character, a fact of consciousness but also object, gives it an intense capacity for 
propagation; images permeate civilizations and charge them with their power ... The circular causality 
that runs from the mental to the objective real through social processes of cumulative causation also 
runs from the objective real to the mental ... Almost all objects produced by man are in some measure 
object-images, they are carriers of latent meanings, not just cognitive but also conative and affectivo-
emotional. Objects-images are almost organisms, or at the very least germs capable of revitalizing and 
developing in the subject (Simondon, 2008, p. 13). 
From this passage we witness how for Simondon the resources for transindividual individuation are 
widespread, including the conative and affectivo-emotional, and how some individuations also become 
sources of information or structural germs for further structuration of the metastable field of the social. In 
Imagination et invention Simondon develops an extensive theory of how images develop within organisms 
to constitute the imagination and how these can also become materialized, through invention, into objects 
which further influence the cycle of image development. From such a perspective it is also clear that those 
images generated by the use of Big Data also intervene in the cycle of images and is thus also productive of 
invention. The situation is thus far more complex than just the passing around of ideas but involves an 
ongoing process of psycho-social individuation and invention. Coupled with his theory of technical 
schemas this also becomes a powerful ontogenetic account of epistemological development. 
From this position Pentland’s claim for the importance of ideas-flow is not entirely incorrect. However, 
it is also far too narrow for accounting how the social is structured and re-structured. Although Pentland’s 
theory has the benefit of also being able to theorize the structuring of groups far smaller than a whole 
society, with its concentration on ideas it still remains too dilute to account for the reality of social novelty 
and thus we should be cautious of claims to the contrary. Bernard Stiegler makes a similar kind of reduc-
tion in his assertion that the pre-individual is just technical (for an excellent discussion of this see 
 Unlike the superficial inter-individual relation the transindividual relation is such that it offers exterior resources for the 5
resolution of the problem of embodied immanence as it penetrates the individuals concerned and brings them into resonance as a 
system. Such resonance is also metastable and thus allows for further transformation of this system.
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Combes, 2013, p. 67-70). Such an assertion is too limited given the breadth of resources that feed into the 
process of social individuation.  
Teleology 
Although Pentland’s proposal for a new sociology is reminiscent of others working in the cybernetic 
tradition he does overlook its concerns regarding teleology. Such an oversight is unfortunate given how 
central the understanding of purpose in relation to systems is in so much of this work. Beniger’s 
distinction between processes of control and their programming towards a purpose has already been 
mentioned. The problem of programming was also something that Stafford Beer wrestled with in relation 
to his VSM. His vision was for a social system that could undertake an active adaptation to a spontaneous 
finality which was itself determined via feedback from the social collective. Beer called this finality 
eudemony or social well-being (Pickering, 2010, p. 272). For Beer the aim was to cybernetically enhance 
democracy so that social adaptations could be decided collectively.  
In social physics the presence or even requirement for such finality is not even considered. What is 
claimed instead is an almost essentialist understanding of the habitual nature of the social: “Social physics 
is based on statistical regularities that span the population, i.e., things that are true of almost everyone 
almost all of the time” (Pentland, 2014, p.189). As I've already argued such an essentialist formulation 
leads to a dubious state of social hypertelia, but additionally, also fails to confront the problem of the pro-
duction of goals towards which social adaptation might occur. 
Simondon (2001, p. 119) was also concerned with teleology in systems that were self-regulating: “In 
self-regulated functioning, all causality has a sense of finality, and all finality has a sense of causality”. The 
use of “sense” here has a double meaning indicating both semantic sense as well as (sense of ) direction. It’s 
not so much the case that purpose should be applied to systems, which would then run the risk of 
hypertelia and normativity, but an awareness that individuation creates new levels of reality the recurrent 
causality of which operate as unities which have an emergent and coherent inclination which demand 
their own aesthetic and axiological consideration. As such Simondon was unwilling to impose sense onto 
individuations but instead tracked their development and mode of regulation in order to do them justice. 
It’s in this sense that his philosophy of technology was concerned with how traditional culture imposed 
inadequate values on emergent techno-social individuations thus generating conflict. 
Simondon (2014, p. 317) understands culture as a “depository of values” out-of-step with technical 
development, which is indifferent to traditional values. As such culture programs the use of technical 
means and imposes on them what Simondon describes as a condition of slavery in that it thwarts technol-
ogy’s freedom to evolve. The assumption that the present code of values is final is therefore to define a 
“reign of purpose” (ibid) that domesticates the technical.  
As we have seen new technology enables “new schemes of intelligibility” and with this the likelihood of 
fresh axiological content. Big Data itself needs to be recognized as a fresh technological advance that will 
also challenge received values (Pentland has already identified privacy as a zone of contention) and needs 
to be understood as such rather than as a neutral means of imposing established cultural values through 
social regulation. It is itself constitutive of a transformation of the environment in that it is productive of 
new needs and desires as well as new imaginings of the social. 
Although this is a gloss of Simondon’s position it is enough to make the point that so far Big Data 
sociology has not confronted the question of the sense of that which it studies, in the connected sense both 
of how the purpose of social systems are divined in relation to technical development (an axiological 
question) nor in respect to what overarching sense data is interrogated (the epistemological question).  
Despite Anderson’s claim that the data will somehow reveal its secrets automatically upon interrogation 
without the need for biased theories or hypothesis it seems clear that Pentland is indeed imposing his own 
ontology onto the data he is collecting. That is to say that purpose is built into the epistemological frame-
works employed to analyse the data. That Pentland’s social ontology implicitly promotes a technocratic 
liberalism should not be a surprise given its cybernetic heritage. Norbert Wiener’s original project was also 
rooted in a liberal humanism, which also had an uneasy tension with his technocratic leanings. 
Conclusion 
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Although it has not been the goal of this article to dismiss the claims being made by some for Big Data for 
aiding the understanding and efficiency of some relatively deterministic systems, we have attempted to 
question some of the claims made that it offers a new and universal method for understanding and man-
aging the social. 
In brief, we maintain that social physics is a development of the cybernetic worldview and as such 
would do well to pay heed to previous work in this area and, in particular, its reworking by Simondon. We 
claim that Big Data fails to account for the importance of the extent and nature of relations social systems 
have with each other and the environment, which is so well captured by the notions of the associated mi-
lieu and pre-individual. Additionally, the limitation of thinking in terms of adaptation needs to be recog-
nized as what is at stake is the integration of systems with a changing environment leading to invention, 
which will confound any attempt at control unless the society so controlled becomes hypertelic. 
In a quotation used above Pentland mentions that Big Data will itself cause a societal phase shift. 
Whilst the recognition of such phenomenon is welcome the point is that such a shift means the interven-
tion of an indeterminism, which by definition, social physics would not be able to predict. Data is not 
information in Simondon’s sense. Big Data says nothing of metastability and resonance. As Beer also 
maintained, the ability to regulate the social required more than an extensive database. Beer’s own prob-
lems with the VSM demonstrate that any such intervention in the complex regulatory causal loops that 
constitute the social, will itself feed back into the system. 
As such we also direct attention to the facticity of Big Data as a new technical development which itself 
will be productive of new individuations and values. It is, to use Simondonian terminology, a technical 
mentality. Occasionally Pentland’s certainty in his project slips and he acknowledges the constructivist 
nature of the epistemology he is actually dealing with, which falls far short of Anderson’s confidence that 
the days of theory are over: 
These data are often indirect and noisy, and so interpretation requires greater care than usual ... We 
need to construct living laboratories – communities willing to try a new way of doing things or, to put 
it bluntly, to be guinea pigs – in order to test and prove our ideas. 
Instead of touting Big Data as a means by which to regulate social homeostasis questions need to be 
asked about how Big Data will construct new orientations of social development? There is some distance 
between this position and that which sees Big Data as finally giving an objective and scientific basis for 
sociology.  
What is really at stake is the production of new practices, epistemologies, and techno-social assem-
blages that will lead to new psycho-social individuations. Simondon offers us a way to more clearly see 
both the importance of ontology for such projects as well as their role in the production of the psycho-
social. 
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